Not long ago it was difficult to find any information about the carbon removal ecosystem in Europe. Beyond academic papers, and a researcher or two at larger environmental non-profits, CDR policy was not an area with a mature ecosystem.
The situation is much different today. Not only is the EU considering ways to incorporate removals into their existing cap-and-trade scheme, but there are non-profits, carbon marketplaces, startups, and a new trade group offering sophisticated information and analysis of the rapidly developing CDR policy landscape in Europe.
One of them is Carbon Gap they describe themselves as “a science-based and philanthropy-funded expert non-profit" NGO working to bring just and equitable carbon removal policies to Europe through informed scientific research. Launched two years ago, the organisation keeps the carbon removal ecosystem informed through its Policy Tracker and regularly publishes articles.” Their most recent piece released last week approaches the thorny topic of avoiding emissions deterrence.
Their senior researcher is Kayla Cohen, whose work focuses on the developing soil carbon policies in Europe and climate justice issues.
Another organization that continues to provide high-level insight in Europe is Carbonfuture, a marketplace for ‘durable’ carbon credits. They claim over 40% of the market for durable carbon removal this year. And luckily for the public they also continue to publish information on the CDR market, including work on the topic of creating a trusted and inclusive MRV system, which we delved into on this show just a few weeks ago. The author of much of this work is their Senior Policy Advisor Sebastian Manhart.
The EU is poised to be a world leader in CDR, as it has been with climate policy. It features ambitious climate targets, robust academic research in the field, a talented labor pool, and a sophisticated non-profit sector taking on the challenge. But it also faces many of the headwinds found elsewhere against CDR such as high-costs, ambivalence from some of the public and existing environmental sector, fear of moral hazard, and broader macro-economic challenges threatening investment into newer climate tech.
On this episode Kayla and Sebastian join to talk about the current situation in Europe, the developments they’d like to see, and where they predict policy will be in 2030 and beyond.
On This Episode
Resources
Carbon Gap article on ‘solutions to mitigation deterrence’
Our show on Carbonfuture’s work on Trust + MRV
Sebastian’s Article on Incorporating CDR in the ETS
Kayla’s Article on the EU Soil Monitoring Law
Carbonfuture report on CDR law in 31 EU States
Subscribe to Climate Workers Anonymous
My other show, Reversing Climate Change
Books referenced in the podcasts, at Bookshop
Full Transcript
Announcer: You’re listening to Carbon Removal Newsroom, a weekly show about current events in the world of carbon removal, from technology and innovation to policymaking and job growth. Brought to you by Nori, the carbon removal marketplace.
Asa Kamer: Hello, everyone, and welcome to Carbon Removal Newsroom. Your regular host, Radhika, is out this week, so I’m going to be filling in. My name is Asa Kamer. I’m the producer of CRN. So not long ago, it was difficult to find much information about the carbon removal ecosystem in Europe. Beyond academic papers and a researcher or two at larger environmental nonprofits, CDR policy was not an area with a mature ecosystem. The situation is much different today. Not only is the EU considering ways to incorporate removals into their existing cap and trade scheme, but there are nonprofits, carbon marketplaces, startups, and a new trade group offering sophisticated information and analysis of the rapidly developing CDR policy landscape in Europe.
One of them is Carbon Gap. They describe themselves as a science-based and philanthropy-funded expert nonprofit NGO working to bring just and equitable carbon removal policies to Europe through informed scientific research. Launched two years ago, the organization keeps the carbon removal ecosystem informed through its policy tracker and regularly publishes articles. Their most recent piece released last week approaches the thorny topic of avoiding emissions deterrence. And I’ll link that and our listeners should definitely check that out. Today we’re joined by their senior researcher, Kayla Cohen, whose work focuses on the developing soil carbon policies in Europe and climate justice issues.
Welcome Kayla. Thanks for joining us.
Kayla Cohen: Hi, thanks. Thanks for having me.
Asa Kamer: Another organization that continues to provide high-level insight in Europe is Carbon Future, a marketplace for durable carbon credits. They claim over 40% of the market for durable carbon removal this year. And luckily for the public, they also continue to publish information on the CDR market, including work on the topic of creating a trusted and inclusive MRV system, which we delved into that report just a few weeks ago on the show. So the author of much of that work is their senior policy advisor, Sebastian Manhart, who joined us today. Thank you for joining us, Sebastian.
Sebastian Manhart: Thank you for having me again. Real pleasure.
Asa Kamer: Wonderful. So the EU is poised to be a world leader in CDR as it has been with climate policy more broadly. It has ambitious climate targets, robust academic research in the field, a talented labor pool, and a sophisticated nonprofit sector taking on the challenge. But it also faces many of the headwinds found elsewhere against CDR, such as high costs, ambivalence from some of the public and existing environmental sector, fear of moral hazard, and broader macroeconomic challenges which threaten investment into newer climate tech. So today I’m going to be speaking with Kayla and Sebastian about the current situation in Europe, the developments they’d like to see and where they predict public policy will be in 2030 and beyond.
So Sebastian, why don’t you start us off? Let’s zoom out. Europe has a net zero target. Can you give us an overview?
Sebastian Manhart: Sure. So Europe, and just as a reminder, that means 27 nation states, has a net zero target for 2050. And what this means is that in all these 27 member states, the bottom floor, the minimum they have to achieve by 2050 is net zero. They can go beyond it, as I’ll explain shortly, but that’s the floor. And they also have a 55% or we have here in Europe a 55% reduction target by 2030. But then there’s a glaring gap between this 55% target and the net zero target, which is something that right now is being worked on with the 2040 targets, which we’ll hopefully see next year and where we can also expect hopefully twin targets for reduction and removals.
When it comes to removals, there’s a couple of targets. So in the Lulu CF sector, there’s a 310 megatonne target by 2030. There’s a storage target of 50 megatonnes by 2030. And there’s kind of a tentative but non-binding target of 500 megatonnes. We have megatonnes of removals by 2030, but all that is really piecemeal and is not really what we need, which is why we’re working on the big targets right now. And finally, at the member state level, again, member states can go beyond the EU targets. And we see that unfortunately, 11 countries have not gone beyond it at all.
Another 11 countries have gone beyond it on the LULUCF front. And only a handful of countries have set specific CDR targets. Portugal probably being the most prominent, which has a 10% removal target set into law. But yeah, it’s very varied beyond the 2050 EU targets.
Asa Kamer: There’s so much happening state to state in the EU, and I’m excited to talk to you about that a little more. Kayla, so your work focuses on soil carbon and soil health more broadly. So can we start with an overview of the state of Europe’s soils?
Kayla Cohen: Yes, of course. There’s rising concern among policymakers and civil society and farmers alike that Europe’s land is in a bit of a And these relate to food security, biodiversity decline, steep socioeconomic challenges for farmers, as well as widespread land degradation and agricultural emissions. So just to kind of dive into the carbon part of that equation. Currently, Europe’s soils are a net source of greenhouse gas emissions, and this could jeopardize EU climate targets if left unchecked. So where do these carbon losses come from? Mainly organic soils used as cropland and grassland.
It’s also worth highlighting the impact of peat extraction, which has the highest carbon loss per hectare of any land use type in Europe. By now, you know, we’re obviously familiar with the feedback loop between soil carbon loss and climate change exacerbating each other. So European farmers are facing floods, fires, pest outbreaks, profit losses, especially in Southern Europe, they’re gearing up for Like a projected crop and livestock production decrease and potentially having to abandon some agricultural land. And that future is especially bleak when we view it from the vantage point of the present, which is already two thirds of EU land is degraded as a result of unsustainable management practices.
And there’s high erosion rates on a lot of land. And this does leave Europe less resilient to climate change and financially bereft because it costs the EU as a 50 billion per year due to the loss of essential soil surfaces. So that kind of paints the picture of not only the soil carbon gap, but also the broader soil health gap and the issues that policymakers are trying to solve with an upcoming kind of wave of new soil policies.
Asa Kamer: Okay, great. That’s a great segue to my next question, which is what is the state of soil governance in the EU, the cornerstone pieces of legislation and policies that are currently in the pipeline?
Kayla Cohen: Sure. So there is some good news. And that is that there’s appetite for an EU legal framework that protects soil and enforces sustainable use. The EU stated an ambition to achieve soil health across its entire territory by 2050. But there is a gap between political rhetoric and action, and there’s quite a lot of contradictions when you look into the soil governance framework already in place. So to speak concretely, in Europe, soil stewards are beholden to some of the EU targets that Sebastian spoke about the beginning, such as climate neutrality by 2050 and achieving the Lulu CF regulation net removals target in 2030.
And those targets set the kind of legal impetus to increase the land carbon sink in Europe, but targets are only half the battle. The other half is creating a supportive policy framework that’s actually conducive to progress and that’s more complicated part. So right now soil carbon Or soil carbon sequestration, I should say, is incentivized through the common agricultural policy, which links direct payments to farmers with the practice of good agricultural and environmental conditions. Think ecosystems, optional subsidies. And, you know, there’s a trend for member states to include soil carbon sequestration into their national level cap strategic plans.
But some civil society actors say the cap is not the tool for the jobs because it continues to incentivize intensive farming, which drives some carbon loss. So there lies the cap paradox. There’s a dual approach, which is creating new union-wide objectives. And then there’s the developing a new business case for land managers, which is much more carrot versus stick. And that’s really the high level debate that’s happening within European soil governance at the moment, with some people saying, we need more sticks and obligations and others saying, no, we want only incentives and voluntary action.
Asa Kamer: We’re going to have the chance to delve into those political dynamics a little more later on. Sebastian, the EU is now considering incorporating CDR into its climate plan. Can you tell us a little bit about that process and what’s going on right now?
Sebastian Manhart: Yeah. So I think it’s pretty clear for EU now that we can’t achieve net zero without CDR, but maybe to first explain the mechanics behind how net zero is supposed to be achieved in Europe. There are three key vehicles. One is the emission We’ve got the trading scheme, which covers, you know, power and heat generation, oil refineries, iron and steel production, and so on. Then we’ve got the emission sharing regulation, which is the other sectors. So transportation, buildings, waste, agriculture. And then we’ve got the land use, land use change and forestry or LULUCF.
Account for basically all the emissions that are happening in Europe. And so that’s where we need to plug in CDR if we really want to make a difference. Now, right now, we don’t have the tools to do it. And so what the EU is working on in its kind of traditional manner of kind of putting all the pieces together before scaling it is what’s called the carbon removal certification framework, CRCF for short. And this is the key building block needed To put into the three mechanisms that I mentioned before and any others that we’ll need in order to use CDR in EU climate policy.
Now, the CoCF is really important for a number of reasons. But first, maybe why I believe it’s a really unique thing that we’re doing here in Europe with the CoCF. It’s hundreds of experts. Working from across industry, academia, and so on for several years on simply defining what robust certification of CDR looks like. And the impact of it will be obviously in EU climate policy. It will affect national policy because governments won’t want to reinvent the wheel. It will probably affect the voluntary carbon market because buyers will align their purchasing behavior with what’s happening in the CRCF.
And it might become a gold standard globally in the same way that data protection, GDPR became the gold standard for data protection. And so the CSEF is really worth following. And right now it’s in a hot phase. Both the parliament will vote on it in November. The EU commission is holding its next meeting on industrial permanent removals at the end of the month. So it’s really a key piece of legislation that I recommend anyone working in CDR to follow.
Asa Kamer: So in November, will they decide, yes, we’re implementing it or not? Or is that just one of many sort of procedural steps that may lead to it being implemented?
Sebastian Manhart: Yeah, maybe what’s worth doing here is just how European politics works. So you’ve got 27 member states, you’ve got the EU setting the policy floor, but then member states have to both ratify that and obviously can go above and beyond and they have autonomy over budgets, for example. So think procurement. But you’ve got three institutions. So you’ve got the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament. And these three all have to agree on something in order for it to pass, which is called the Trilog. So usually you start with the European Commission.
They kind of develop the first draft. Also, if you want to influence something, this is the best time to get in because it’s early days. And then they publish. It goes to the parliament and the council, and they independently work on this. So parliament, I elected MEPs, members of parliament every five years. Next one is next year. And the council is 27 delegates from the most relevant ministry of each member state. And they essentially are working independently on this text and then they get together and then they go independently, then they get together.
And what we’re having now in November is the plenary of the parliament voting on the stance of the European parliament, which is a pretty big step that will set the way of at least one of the three institutions.
Asa Kamer: Just one more follow-up. So you mentioned three different systems that cover all the emissions in the EU. So will the CRCF, will that be implemented into each one independently?
Sebastian Manhart: A frustration with the CRCF is that they refuse, the commission has refused in its original text to give in any indication of how it’s going to be used. So they essentially just say, we’re going to deal with the certification. Whatever governments, the EU or the VCM want to do with it is beyond our scope. So this is a problem because, for example, right now we have other climate legislation like the Green Claims Directive, which desperately needs a link to the CSCS, but it’s not there yet. So it’s too early to say how exactly, or the emission trading scheme is another good example.
It’s too early to say how exactly the CSEF will be plugged in, but it’s pretty obvious that if you’re developing a piece of climate policy and you want to have CDR in it, you’re going to go to the CSEF because that’s going to be the most robust place where certification will be managed.
Asa Kamer: This will help certify carbon removal and then other bodies will... Incorporate that or not into their existing or future systems. Okay. Thank you. I will admit that took me a little while to understand. So speaking of large overarching climate policies that are currently being worked on back to you, Kayla, that he is working on a soil monitoring law with the goal of recovering soil health across the area by 2050. So can you tell us how this is going to work and what is the connection to the carbon side of the soil equation?
Kayla Cohen: Yeah, sure. So to fit this into Sebastian’s very well laid out description, the commission has just released this summer the proposal for what was formerly the soil health law and is now, I’d argue, a sides down soil monitoring law. The shift from health to monitoring really shows that the onus is on monitoring. So member states will now be obliged to monitor their soil health. And how will this be done? Well, the commission has put forward in the annex of the law, a set of soil descriptors and a set of criteria for how to measure health according to them.
So soil carbon is one of those criteria. Of course, there’s a strong link between soil organic carbon and overall soil health. Of course, it’s not everything. And that should be kind of stated because we don’t want to Go down carbon tunnel vision when it comes to soil. And so that means that the EU will have a big picture of how much carbon is fluxing in and out of its soil. Now, will that picture be updated every five years slash will that be useful is another question. And so Overall, what’s really great is that there’ll be a more kind of harmonized approach to monitoring soil health across each of the 27 member states and a methodology for soil sampling.
Another thing to flag is the voluntary soil health certification. And here’s where we kind of touched on the CRCS that Sebastian mentioned as well. So the proposal suggested that Essentially, instead of obliging land stewards to bridge their soil health gap, say you’ve monitored a body of soil, it turns out it’s not healthy, which is now empirically verifiable. And now you’re not obliged, as far as I understand, to rectify that. The proposal as it stands says, we’d like to create a voluntary Incentives for land managers to get a soil health certification and for this to be complementary to the CRCF.
So how this will unfold does require civil society scrutiny on two accounts. Number one, we don’t want to contract carbon tunnel vision when it comes to soil. So really carbon should be A co-benefit to any kind of soil policy and climate should not be the main priority, especially when you think about the competing priorities for the land at the moment, along with renewable energy, biodiversity, just so many other priorities. And secondly, we need to safeguard the CRCF standards so that a soil health certificate passes the same level of quality as Any other carbon removal certification.
So that’s unclear. And the last thing to say is that the law lacks a binding target to enshrine the EU’s 2050 soil health goal. And that’s really being lamented by a lot of environmental NGOs that were expecting that rhetorical vision to be reflected and enshrined in the proposal.
Asa Kamer: I want to ask you both about the sort of political dynamics involved in furthering the CDR policy that we’re talking about here. So Sebastian, I’m going to start with you. You told us about the structure of some of the different bodies that the CRCF is going to have to work through. Can you give us an idea of the political dynamics involved in creating more support? In creating this policy, be it industries, different geographical rivalries, political spectrum. Who is for this and who is working against it?
Sebastian Manhart: So in general, and I mean, also maybe for listeners who want to shape some of these policies, whether or not in the future, it’s important to note there’s obviously two levels. There’s the EU and the national level, and you have to play each level at the right time. And at the EU level, you’ve got the three institutions that I mentioned, the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. And again, you have to work with the right institution at the right time. So very early on, it really pays off to work. For example, if you’re interested in CDR, European ETS integration, you should work with the Commission now because they’re working on a proposal that they’re going to publish in 2026.
So now it’s really early days and a great time to get in. There’s no point talking now to parliamentarians who will see this file for the first time in three years. If you’re working on the CSEF, now you need to talk to parliamentarians. So it’s all about timing and the right institution. But at the end of the day, it all comes down to nation states. And I worked for Angela Merkel’s Chancery for a while in Brussels, and I’ve seen firsthand that, you know, Germany and France, I don’t want to say 60, 70%, but they kind of are 60, 70% of the decision at the end of the day.
The big states and especially Germany and France carry a huge weight, which means for CDR, we need those two states on board and they’re currently lagging behind a little bit. And yeah, I’m sure we’re going to talk about what’s happening in Germany right now. I play a big role there, but we need to work with the member states. And finally, there’s also the party dynamics. So if we look, for example, like in any other country, but in the parliament right now, in the European parliament, different parties, different coalitions of parties, Have different agendas when it comes to the use of biomass, to the use of novel technology, to the use of ocean.
And as such, you definitely have to, like in every other country or legislature, you have to work with the specific requirements of the different parties. And broadly, we see support for CDR in almost all parties. I would almost say the biggest pushback I see, at least for like permanent CDR, is in the Greens. And that’s where we’re seeing a lot of concerns and often fairly dogmatic approaches against any type of CDR because there’s a classic emission reduction only, no removals approach. But other than that, we’re seeing pretty broad support across all parties.
Asa Kamer: And Kayla, kind of similar question to you. Can we hear a little bit about the political dynamics around soil health? So carbon, what are some of the key debates and who’s advocating for what?
Kayla Cohen: Yeah, sure. It’s a fascinating space. I think it’s so fraught in some ways because soil has a dual nature as both a public good that we depend on for our basic human needs. Um, not to mention that all specimens do, and it’s also a private resource. And so we’ve got the kind of private economic interests, um, Rallied every time perhaps an obligation is set in the works, for example. And so there’s a lot to be gained and there’s a lot to be lost. And so, for example, now the European Parliament has separate committees that negotiate and kind of think through the file.
And so the Committee on Agriculture within the European Parliament, they’re devising their take and they’re really focused on maximizing the revenue stream for farmers from any kind of carbon farming, quote unquote. Intervention that the CRCF allows for. So for example, Sebastian mentioned the use cases, which are famously mysterious. Well, one of the three kind of pinners of the CRCF is what they call carbon farming, and there’s a bit of a Um, hot debate right now as to what’s the definition of carbon farming can, um, it’s includes, uh, activities that relate to simple reduction of farming emissions, for example.
So, I mean, we would argue it shouldn’t, uh, it should be, you know, what it was set out to do, which is carbon removal, but there’s a lot of states or increasing widening the definition of carbon farming also So I think it’s really important for us to be able to that. Even, I think what’s very sneaky and also super problematic, the idea of kind of changing the definition of permanent carbon storage so that it’s essentially less tight from several centuries to something much more vey. And of course, soil carbon should not be treated as a permanent carbon storage for many reasons.
Political tension is potentially a misunderstanding for how much revenue could carbon farming actually bring farmers. I’ve been speaking to a few soil stakeholders in Europe. Stay tuned for a discussion paper that’s going to be published later this month. And they were saying, you know, it’s going to be the cherry on top. It’s not going to be a game changer. And so perhaps, yeah, there’s some kind of data analysis that needs to come in to inform this debate.
Asa Kamer: Would you say the misunderstanding generally goes one way or the other? Like stakeholders are assuming that it’ll be more or stakeholders are assuming that it’ll be less than you think it will actually be?
Kayla Cohen: Yeah, I think, you know, here we wade into territory that I’m certainly not an expert in. If the political zeitgeist would benefit from a very big carbon farming pie, then it exists. And when that would not be beneficial to whoever is arguing for it, then I’d imagine it shrinks considerably. I’ve not really seen an estimate in everything that I’ve read. And so, yeah, I think that My view is that it’s generally overstated by advocates for this. And then there are people who are very anti-commodification of soil carbon. And I think for many really good reasons as well.
So I haven’t even explored that side of the debate, but there’s farm representatives and NGOs, et cetera, that argue against commodifying soil carbon.
Asa Kamer: So I’m going to stick with you, Kayla, and I want to talk to both you guys a little bit more about policies that you’d like to see some sort of recommendations you have or reflections you have. So you started to touch on this, Kayla, but you said that the current soil plan doesn’t work fast enough to alleviate soil problems. So and you wrote about this pretty recently and we’ll link to that and people should check that out. What are those problems and what do you think needs to be done for soil health that isn’t being done in the current plan?
Kayla Cohen: Firstly, I’m a big advocate for legally binding targets. I think that the EU should enshrine its 2050 soil health goal and there should be stakes for member states not actually reaching that. I think it’s worth stating that I really wouldn’t want to see an EU in 2030 that’s gone down the carbon tunnel when it comes to something as diversely valuable as soil. To ready soil carbon for regulated markets would likely be a very expensive exercise. Monitoring carbon fluxes regularly is costly, and we need to ask ourselves if that’s a worthwhile exercise.
What’s the opportunity cost if we opt for market mechanisms over other measures? It’s best that soil is not primarily viewed through the climate lens, but through a multidimensional lens, and the primary goal Is to address Europe’s land poly crisis and banty on market and voluntary mechanisms seems to me too risky when we think of what’s at stake. So I hope that the EU takes a smart, holistic approach, keeping its eye on the overall goal and not getting waylaid by the business interests of a few. And I think that also. A likely reality for farmers is that, as I mentioned, carbon farming would only marginally add to their profits, especially if use cases with CRCS are restricted as carbon gap would like to see.
So we advocate for a light for light policy where soil carbon would only be kind of permissible to balance residual biogenic emissions. So that would restrict the size of the market even more. And then of course, for additionality, as it pertains to the CRCS, the baselines must be set appropriately to ensure that additional carbon is actually being stored. And then I know we’re going to get onto this a bit later, but carbon removal policies should be just and equitable. And there are many ways of doing this and with soil carbon policies as well, it applies.
Every policy has burdens and benefits that should be equitably distributed. So I hope that we think about soil carbon as part of the kind of climate justice under that banner. And then we make sure that any European action is not bad for climate as a whole. So for example, extensification of European agriculture. It might be great for many reasons, but we need to ask, could this lead to deforestation elsewhere? Might there be carbon leakage? And if that supply gap is filled through more carbon intensive practices elsewhere, what’s going to be the impact on climate action as a whole?
Asa Kamer: Going to go back to you. You’ve recently released a breakdown of CDR policy in 31 European states. You’ve touched on this, but I would like to hear you talk a little bit more about it. What did you find and what are the leading states doing right?
Sebastian Manhart: It was a fascinating analysis. And as listeners of this podcast will know, because I came here to talk about another analysis we did of 51 US states, we did something similar here for 27 EU member states and then the other four most important ones, so Iceland, UK, Switzerland, and Norway. And what came out of that was a bunch of things. So first, the leading states are Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden, pretty clearly. Why? I mean, examples, Denmark has a zero target for 2045, a 70% reduction target for 2030, so going way beyond the EU target.
And they have a specific, not just CDR target, but biochar target. So two megatonnes by 2030, for example. In Switzerland, they actually have CDR and CCS targets for 2030, 2040 and 2050. And they’ve even defined that they’re going to procure five megatonnes of CDR from abroad. So they’ve really gone really specific. And Sweden, they have a three megatonne, BEX and Biochar target for 2030. And something that often goes unnoticed because, you know, we’re talking about DAC hubs, 3. 5 billion for DAC in the US and everything. They’ve actually allocated 3.
3 billion euros for BEX alone by 2030. Which is huge and nobody really talks about. But for me, that’s a significant amount of money going into BEX. So those are three really interesting countries. And other takeaways, the heavyweights, I spoke about it earlier, but Germany, France, Italy, Spain, they’re not worth I’m seeing some windows of opportunity that we can talk about, but they’re not where they should be if we really want to push CDR forward. There’s a big, third one, there’s a big East-West divide. So we see Western Europe being much more advanced than Eastern Europe on CDR.
And yeah, broadly, that’s also a lot of opportunity, right? Like some countries like Croatia actually seizing the opportunity and trying to advance using the natural resources to build on CDR. But yeah, those are just a few. There’s way more to unpack. So I really recommend that people just go out, go and check out the report.
Asa Kamer: Yeah, and we’ll definitely link that. Since you mentioned biochar, there was recently a one sub agriculture subcommittee that in the EU that voted to include biochar into the CRCF. So I just wanted to hear what you think of this move and what’s sort of going on with that.
Sebastian Manhart: Yes. And maybe again, for context, this was the AGRI committee that Kayla mentioned earlier, and they are not the lead committee. So the way that it works in the European Parliament is every file, like the CSEF, gets a lead committee, in this case, ENVY, the Environment Committee. But there’s also committees for opinion, and AGRI is one of them. And what they’ve essentially suggested is to include biochar carbon removal as a permanent removal method alongside ducks and becks. And why are they doing it? They’re doing it because there has been recent scientific evidence coming out of the geochemical field that suggests that if you produce it with the right circumstances, the right environment, biochar A 97% plus of what comes out of it can be what’s called inertonite, which is the most stable form of carbon on the planet, which according to the papers is stable on geological timescales, which they don’t even say thousands of years because they just say geological timescales.
Now, my personal take is... I mean, it makes sense because BCI biochar or biochar carbon removal is by far the most mature permanent carbon removal we have. It has a technology readiness level in Europe of eight for several of these installations. Some would even argue nine for others. It’s accounted for 87% of all permanent removal globally 2022 and for 92% of all deliveries globally in the first half of 2023. And it’s the cheapest form of permanent removal. So for me, kind of These things taken together make it an obvious choice to be considered, which doesn’t mean that it’s going to go through.
Envy is more conservative when it comes to biochar, and we don’t yet know where they will land. So there’s still a lot of way to go to see what’s happening in the plenary in November, but it’s certainly an interesting move, I agree.
Asa Kamer: Awesome. Someone from Carbon Futuron, I want to make sure to ask about biochar because I know that’s something you guys have done a lot of work with. And for listeners of the show, make sure to subscribe because we’re going to have a researcher working on that new sort of field of study with biochar that Sebastian referenced coming on very soon. So we can talk about biochar permanence. So make sure you’re subscribed so you don’t miss that excellent conversation. I would love to, while we have you guys talk a little bit about what you’d like to see 2030 and beyond in regards to carbon removal and soil carbon.
Sebastian Manhart: Yes. So again, just for people who are less familiar with the ETS, I actually think it’s something that is really interesting to just know a few details about. The ETS is by far the largest so-called compliance carbon market in the world. It accounts for 87%. And to speak in terms of numbers, it’s traded 751 billion euros last year and it provided 39 billion euros of revenue for the European Union. So it’s absolutely massive. And you can imagine what would happen if CDR got integrated into it. You know, we hype, I don’t know, frontiers, $1 billion over many years, right?
We’re talking here about potentially $39 billion per year of generation through the ETS. And now the reason that it can’t be integrated before 2030 is that the ETS works in phases. Right now we’re in the fourth phase and the fourth phase is from 2021 to 2030. So there won’t be anything happening before 2030. But the European Commission have to deliver, I mentioned this earlier, a proposal on what this integration could look like by 2026. And again, it might seem really far away, but now is the time to actually work on this.
And in the blog that you mentioned, we actually looked at what this could look like. We looked at the academic literature. We thought about our own experiences and opinions and hypotheses, and we essentially Suggests a couple of things for the integration. The ideal step-up would actually be not to be integrated into the ETS at all, but to have a separate, dedicated removal trading scheme. So essentially a parallel system that is like the ETS, covers potentially the same industries, but focuses just on removals, just to keep things clean and separate. That’s very, very unlikely.
So the next best option is that we integrate it into DTS, but with a strong intermediary, like a carbon central bank that manages the supply and the cost of it. Because if you just integrate it straight away, it might get really messy with the cost of avoidance, potentially being higher than the cost of removal. And again, we could talk about this for hours, but an intermediary is probably a good choice. And the final thing that we think would be really smart is just rooting it deeply in the CRCF and focusing on the highest Value the highest permanence credit, the highest permanence CDR first.
So say the CSEF says, I don’t know, DAX, BEX, Biochar. That’s what we should start with to really make sure that we lower the risk of this integration at first. But yeah, it’s super interesting. I recommend that anyone working in CDR and thinking about 2030 onwards gets involved with ETS integration because that could really provide a step change to the industry.
Asa Kamer: Kayla, you also focus on climate justice paradigms in your work, exploring the intersection of carbon removal. What is the current state of climate justice measures when it comes to CDR and soil in the EU? And what are a few measures that you hope will be implemented into EU CDR governance going forward?
Kayla Cohen: Sure. Just a small question then. I think just to step back a moment and look at how justice measures It surfaces in European climate discourse and policies. Carbon Debt is sitting on an analysis of just that, basically working out where does certain terms show up in key policies? And what’s clear is that there is, as the European Green Deal hoped for, An attempt to mainstream some justice concerns into European climate policies at large. So for example, there’s been changes to the EU ETS and now there’s a social climate fund to help to more justly And fairly spread the burdens of that change to the ETS.
There’s also the just transition mechanism, which is really around how to create a just transition for workforces that will have to stop their work due to climate change impacts of that industry. And so that’s the kind of background that EU CDR policies emerge from. Um, it’s, it’s thin on the ground when we talk about CDR policies in Europe and it’s even thinner on the ground when we talk about justice considerations. Um, it’s, I think it’ll be fair to say definitely an afterthought, um, if, if at all a thought. Um, so for example, in the CRCF, um, there is.
Scarce mention of terms like fairness and justice, entirely neglects terms like equality, equity, and inclusivity, which show up in many other climate policies in the EU. And its only consideration seems to be do no significant harm principle, which is really around minimizing harm. And so yes, when we talk about justice and CDR, it’s very important for us to consider the ways that CDR could create harm and to safeguard against that. Um, and I would encourage everyone to read the mitigation deterrence white paper that Carbon Gap just released, um, because it touches on ways that governments can actually reduce that particular very valid concern.
Um, But then there’s also the paradigm of using CDR governance to increase the equity and the quality and other justice outcomes within Europe and within the international community. So there are some philosophies and researchers thinking about just this question. Admittedly, it’s quite a few. I find it really inspiring when I do come across So for example, there is one climate justice approach, which would say carbon removal is a great candidate for restorative justice, where you’ve got an unequal amount of contribution to the problem. Europe, for example, has a history of emitting more than other nations and has a higher ability to pay.
And so according to those two equity principles, they should kind of take on more of the carbon removal responsibility. And you can, once you get into international climate politics on the kind of COP stage, this is where carbon removal discourse hasn’t yet gotten to, but I think the question of who is responsible Full carbon removal needs to happen. It has so many justice kind of angles to it. And one philosopher calls it kind of, I’m going to misquote him now, but A big lost opportunity climate justice advocates and I hope at least, I think CDR could go many ways and I think that it’s Carbon Gap’s role to help it on the best track.
Asa Kamer: Well, yeah, just a small question there. So Sebastian, you mentioned in July when you’re on the show that you’re working with a new CDR trade group in Germany. And I was hoping you could give us an update on how that’s going, what you’re working towards, what your progress has been, and how that’s all going.
Sebastian Manhart: Yeah, I’m super happy to. I mean, again, Germany, all biggest economy in the world, biggest economy in Europe, and it’s really the driver behind a lot of European legislation. And so if we want to affect European legislation, but also really just the full biggest economy in the world, we need to Focus on Germany. Also, obviously, a personal passion. I work for Merkens Chancellery. I am German. For me, there were a lot of reasons to focus on Germany. And yeah, I’m very proud to announce that we have founded the Deutsche Verband für Negative Emission.
That’s quite a mouthful, but DVNE for short. In July 2023, we had 31 founding members across all CDR pathways. We had buyers. We have investors. We have big companies. We have small companies. We have everyone. And we’re going to have around 50 members by the end of the year, I expect. And I was voted as the chair of the board, so I’ll be heavily involved moving forward. And our mission is really to support net zero by 2045, which is Germany’s stated target, which requires CDR, as we know, and net negative thereafter.
More specifically, we want to bring together the startup ecosystem, which is thriving in Germany, a big industry. We’ve got massive companies in Germany that if we can turn them into buyers and get them onto the CDR wagon, that will be huge, academia, politics, and we’re doing it. Just an example, literally in a few days on the 12th, we’re hosting a parliamentary breakfast in the Bundestag. So we’re going to have the offices of 20 MPs all together listening to what we have to say about CDR and discussing CDR. We have our launch event in Berlin on December 11th, which is going to be a bigger event.
Again, very close to the Bundestag with a lot of politicians attending. We’re announcing our executive director soon. So watch the space for that. And yeah, really a shout out to anyone who Who is interested in CDR in Germany, get in touch whether you want to be a member. You don’t have to be German. You can also be just interested or involved with the German market. Whether you are a funder, you want to work for us or anything else you have to say, reach out to info at dvne.org, write to me, follow us on LinkedIn.
And yet we’d love to hear from you.
Asa Kamer: We interview a good amount of startups on the show. Can you give us just a little bit of a overview of, you know, are there any CDR startups in Germany? Are there a lot? What are they working on? What are you seeing? Just kind of just give us a little picture of that.
Sebastian Manhart: This was amazing for me because I expected a handful and suddenly they all came out of the woodworks. And it’s actually incredible. We have startups members in every single technology pathway. And what I think is really amazing is... A lot of them, like a lot of CDR, it comes out of academia, right? And Germany is a center of academic excellence, especially on the natural sciences. And so we’re seeing really innovative approaches. Like if I think about, we spoke about biochar, some of the most High-end biochar machinery in the world comes out of Germany.
Some of the DAC companies that are totally in stealth mode or barely coming out of stealth mode that have taken approaches to saving energy that when I heard about it, I was like, wow, this is crazy. This is actually how DAC could really take off. So we’re seeing a lot of incredible science being turned into startups in Germany across all technologies. So now we just need the right regulatory environment. And then I think Germany could really become a global leader in the field.
Asa Kamer: Excellent. We’re going to have to leave it there, but I want to thank both of you for joining us. This is a great high-level discussion. I feel a lot more informed about EU CDR policy, and we’re going to have to have you both on in the future to give us an update because it sounds like there’s a lot happening on both fronts. Thank you all for listening, and thank you, Kayla and Sebastian.
Kayla Cohen: Thank you very much. Thank you.
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